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When asked to talk to this disting­
uished audience, I decided to talk 
about my exposure to Dutch planning. 
In this respect, I am reminded of the 
characters in the Spielberg science 
fiction movie to which the title of this 
paper alludes and who have physically 
encountered extra-terrestrials. I reflect 
on my experience by describing my 
encounters, over more than twenty-one 
years, as a planning academic and 
educator, with Dutch planning.
I doubt, though, whether there are any 
direct lessons to be drawn, let alone 
lessons for post-apartheid South Af­
rica. For reasons too obvious to be­
labour (small country, a people disci­
plined by the perennial fight against 
the sea, the ensuing Dutch attitudes 
towards land, and a, so far, strong 
housing policy) the preconditions of 
planning are favourable. Rather, les­
sons of the achievements, and also the 
shortcomings, of Dutch planning are 
indirect and require theoretical reflec­
tion. The ultimate lesson will, indeed, 
be that academic work, reflecting on 
planning practice, is the best way of 
learning from each other, thus re­
emphasizing the old saying that there 
is nothing more useful than good 
theory.
More specifically, the lessons relate to 
the role of plans in planning, to the 
discipline of planning (for which the 
Dutch have coined the term planology) 
and to planning doctrine. The role of 
plans was the focus of a comparison 
of local planning in the Netherlands 
and in England and Wales, my first 
encounter with Dutch planning. Plano­
logy as a discipline became an issue in 
the second encounter during the Dutch 
version of the “proceduralist” versus 
“substantivist” conflict in planning 
theory. Planning doctrine is a concept 
formulated in an effort to come to 
grips with my third encounter with the 
relative success of strategic planning 
in the Netherlands.
The occasion for these encounters is 
simply told: After having spent the 
best parts of seven years in Great 
Britain, helping with developing the 
Oxford Polytechnic (now Oxford 
Brookes University) planning courses, 
I was appointed at Delft University of 
Technology in 1974, moving to the 
University of Amsterdam in 1977. 
Since then, I do research and teach 
there on what since 1982 is a fully- 
fledged planning course, not unlike 
British “three-plus-one” courses.2 I 
cariy a Dutch passport and Dutch is 
one of my working languages.
First Encounter: The Leiden-Oxford 
Study
Needless to say, neither Delft nor 
Amsterdam appointed me oh the 
strength of my Dutch experience. 
Nay, I was appointed on basis of my 
work on planning theory. Still, I 
wanted to find out about Dutch plan­
ning, so what better way than mount­
ing research spanning my previous, 
albeit modest exposure to British 
planning and my new environment? 
Firstly, such research could test the 
hypotheses in “Planning Theory” 
(Faludi 1984, first published 1973). 
Secondly, inspired by the less well- 
known sequel to the famous book “A 
Systems Approach to Urban and 
Regional Planning” (McLoughlin 
1969), the title of which is “Control 
and Urban Planning” (McLoughlin 
1973), I wanted to focus initially, not 
on plans and plan-making, but on 
implementation, and that way to ana­
lyze the impact of plans on develop­
ment3.
When it came to pass4, the research 
team5, somewhat to my chagrin, re­
jected the idea of testing my precon­
ceived hypotheses. Rather, we made 
do with the bare bones of a conceptual 
framework, and from there we let 
empirical reality take over. I have
never returned to the hypotheses in 
“Planning Theory” since.
However, we did start with implemen­
tation. In both towns selected for 
comparison, Leiden in the Netherlands 
and Oxford in England, we focused on 
fairly routine developments to estab­
lish what the role of plans in them had 
been: If ever I was put in a similar 
position, I would do the same: look at 
how the environment comes about, 
and what the role of plans in its devel­
opment is.
As regards findings, I focus on the 
Dutch side6. These findings set me on 
a course of rethinking the role of 
plans. Here was a system of world 
feme, but the legally binding plans 
which it produced were honoured 
more in the breach than in the observ­
ance. Even after the planning act of 
19657 had come into full force in 
1970, more than two thirds of all 
building permits in Leiden were given 
in contravention of the relevant plans! 
Leiden was neither special, nor, stren­
uous efforts to rectify it notwithstand­
ing, has the problem disappeared 
since. This casts doubt on the role of 
plans as conceived by the law.
Dutch attitudes on this are mixed. 
Some decry the cavalier manner in 
which plans are circumvented. Others 
accept them to the point where they 
see plans as useless. In discussions at 
the time, one of the practitioners made 
revealing comments. Having seen to it 
that the project was completed at the 
requisite speed, almost regardless of 
what the plan had said, this central 
operator behind the'development of a 
neighbourhood of approximately five- 
thousand homes in our presence re­
minded one of his colleagues that it 
was high time for a plan to be adopt­
ed. One of his neighbours had started 
building a shed, which being a resi­
dent himself of that neighbourhood, he 
objected to. Thus, the plan was an
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instrument for preserving the physical 
fabric once it had been built. Pressed 
on this, the same person pointed to a 
scheme on the wall of his office indi­
cating the developers to whom various 
sections of the entire scheme had been 
allocated. This scheme had little to do 
with the statutory plan, but for him it 
had been the framework which he had 
referred to.
What to make of such a role of plans, 
even in a system highly regarded for 
its achievements? Because of our 
approach, doing studies of projects 
first, and of the relevant plans only 
afterwards, our answers were perhaps 
somewhat loaded in favour of develop­
ment and its progress. We looked at 
the plans as the operators in the field 
did: as hurdles to be overcome in 
solving immediate and pressing prob­
lems. We began to see plan depart­
ures, not as violations of principles 
enshrined in grandiose documents, but 
as reasonable adaptations to the exi­
gencies of situations. In other words, 
in the tussle between implementing the 
plan and promoting development, we 
sided with the operators who seemed 
to have good arguments on their side. 
What point would there have been, for 
instance, in insisting on high-rise 
development for the sole reason that 
the plan drawn up some years before 
foresaw in such development? Con­
sumers in an emerging buyers’ market 
preferred low-rise development, and 
so developers were unwilling to build 
high-rise, and, plan or no plan, that 
was the end of it.
The main focus in interpreting such 
experiences has been, not on the lack 
of implementation (an age-old com­
plaint of planners) but on flexibility, 
hence the title of the book: “Flexibili­
ty and Commitment in Planning” 
(Thomas et al. 1978). By that time, I 
had re-appraised Friend and Jessop 
(1974, first published 1969) and the 
“LO.R.-school” (after the Institute for 
Operational Research). Other than 
what the name suggests, they were 
advocating a “soft” approach paying 
attention to processes and to impon­
derables in decision-making. Above 
all, they propounded a radically new 
philosophy which I have emulated ever 
since. It is that planning is not pri­
marily about making plans but about 
improving day-by-day decisions. I 
sense an affinity with Friedmann
(1993) where he portrays planning as 
connecting knowledge and action in 
the public domain. However, he tends 
to deprecate the role of plans. I main­
tain that plans have a role to play. It is 
to provide frameworks for decision­
making. Sometimes, we are also say­
ing: plans are investments in improv­
ing day-by-day decision-making. 
However, plans need not be imple­
mented to be effective. All that we ask 
is that they be referred to during 
decision-making.
Unfortunately, this pits you against the 
planners of most countries of the 
world, where (on paper, if not in 
practice) planning evolves around 
binding plans. These plans seem to 
connote power for the planners. In 
actual fact, binding plans are counter­
productive. The exception to the rule 
of binding plans dominating the think­
ing of planners is Britain where until 
not long ago development control 
decisions have been taken on their 
merits, thereby paying regard to the 
plan, no more. Even now that the 
British planning system is said to be 
“plan-led”, my British friends assure 
me that this means no more than a 
presumption in favour of the plan.
Since then, Van der Valk has taken 
this reflection on the role of plans 
further8. He takes his cues from the 
Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy formulating two 
ideal-typical approaches to planning 
They help in interpreting the insistence 
of Dutch planners, shown by Van der 
Valk to be the common thread in the 
development of planning ever since 
the late nineteenth century, on a pivo­
tal role for plans. The first approach is 
the technocratic approach. It assumes 
a strong role for authorities in safe­
guarding the public interest. As the 
experts, planners are called upon to 
articulate this public interest. Every­
thing evolves around the Plan. There 
is a twofold assumption underlying: 
(a) allowing only such development as 
fits into the Plan will make developers 
fall into line, and the desired end-state 
will be approximated; (b) the Plan 
caters to scientifically established 
needs. To reveal them, much energy 
is spent on surveys and forecasts, as if 
they could reveal the one and only 
form of the Plan. It follows also that 
those implementing the Plan require 
no discretion. The Plan has taken care
of everything. The technocratic ap­
proach leads to a plan-led system.
The sociocratic approach pays atten­
tion to the views of others. Authorities 
are not the only ones who are able to 
act in terms of the public interest and 
not above other actors either. This 
leaves room for negotiations. The role 
of planners is less central than accord­
ing to the technocratic view. This 
view is more amenable to flexibility, 
meaning that the plan can be reconsid­
ered.
Van der Valk has identified two forms 
of plans complementing each of these 
two approaches, project plans and 
strategic plans. (See also Faludi 1989, 
Faludi & Van der Valk 1994:11) Pro­
ject plans are blueprints. Interaction 
between those concerned focuses on 
plan adoption. Once adopted, it forms 
an unambiguous guide to action. 
Adoption implies a definite image of 
the future. Consideration of time is re­
stricted to the phasing of works. A 
project plan is expected to lead to 
results specified beforehand. Strategic 
plans, on the other hand, deal with the 
coordination of actors, each making 
decisions of his or her own. Since all 
actors want to keep options open, 
timing is crucial. Rather than a finish­
ed product, a strategic plan is a mo­
mentary record of fleeting agreements 
reached. It forms a framework for 
negotiations and is indicative. The 
future remains open. Action never 
flows automatically from a strategic 
plan. Each decision needs justification 
in its own right. It will be clear that 
after the Leiden-Oxford study, I prefer 
plans to be of this kind.
Second Encounter: Planology
By the time the Leiden-Oxford project 
drew to a close, I had taken up my 
Amsterdam appointment. My prede­
cessor, Willem Steigenga, the first 
holder of a chair in planology9, had 
been one of the founding fathers of the 
discipline. I began to explore the 
origins of planology and the state 
which the discipline and practice were 
in.
In Dutch, the term is “planologie”. In 
a paper explaining this concept to an 
international audience, Needham
(1988) Anglicizes it as planology, and
19 Town and Regional Planning No 40. 1996R
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in our English-language text book on 
Dutch planning in English (Faludi and 
Van der Valk 1994), we have fol­
lowed his lead. What the term stands 
for is a social-science approach to 
planning.
The term as such has probably been 
coined by the now largely forgotten 
pioneer J de Casseres lecturing on the 
“Foundations of planology” in 192910. 
In 1944, P and F Bakker Schut pub­
lished the first book under the title 
“Planologie”11. But what is it? An 
authoritative academic committee has 
defined planology as involving "... 
scientific and methodological reflection 
on spatial ordering and planning, 
forming -  on the basis of empirical 
research ... descriptive, explanatory 
and normative theories”12, and this is 
the definition that I subscribe to.
Engineers and not social scientists 
have been the first to advocate scien­
tific. planning. They were later re­
placed by geographers providing the 
knowledge base for planning13. In fact 
they regarded planning as applied 
geography. They had a tradition of 
making regional monographs. Based 
on detailed surveys, these monographs 
enforced the engineering ethos of 
exactitude and comprehensiveness. On 
this basis, as long as they were given 
the opportunity to do research, geog­
raphers were content initially with the 
division of labour under “survey- 
before-plan”. Over time, they became 
restive though. It was my predecessor 
Steigenga who articulated this by 
focusing on the step from knowledge 
to action, defining it as a constructive 
task, culminating in political decision­
making. A geographer himself, Stei­
genga had been doing planning re­
search at Rotterdam before being 
appointed a professor in 1962. A 
Labour member also of the Provincial 
Legislature, he was concerned with 
rendering political decisions more 
systematic. A programmatic paper on 
“Social-science research and physical 
planning” written as early as 1956 
marks him as a representative of 
modem planning thought concerned 
with the organization and procedures, 
but above all with the methodology of 
planning. In this paper, he saw plan­
ning as “... the sum total of decisions 
aiming to create the conditions for a 
particular type of social development 
...”14 This implied “social engineer­
ing”, a task fitting for social scientists.
The but of his criticism was of course 
the pre-eminent designer role in plan­
ning. Rather than relying, as designers 
did, and to some extent still do, on the 
creative leap, Steigenga recommended 
the development of models of spatial 
structure to provide the basis for 
publicly accountable decision-making. 
In this way, he surpassed the positi­
vism of classic Dutch planning trying 
to derive policies straight from sur­
veys of the “facts”.
Steigenga passed away in 1974. The 
year after that, Van der Cammen 
published a paper on the process 
approach which marked him as his 
disciple. Van der Cammen showed the 
two sides to it: planning as a cyclical 
process, and planning as a social 
process. He took note also of the 
demise of blueprint planning15. A 
paper by Kreukels gave an overview 
of new methods, categorizing them 
into formal and behavioural. His 
concern ever since has been the inte­
gration of planning theory with the 
behavioural sciences16. A group from 
Nijmegen University discussed similar 
themes around an exercise in their 
region17. There are frequent references 
to procedural planning theory, but 
soon the latter began to evoke un­
ease18. Of course, Dutch academics 
also partook in the grand Marxist- 
inspired debates of the seventies, but 
without making an original contribu­
tion.
This was the state of the art when I 
joined the University of Amsterdam. I 
did not have a strong sense that I was 
expected to continue the work of 
Steigenga (of which I myself was only 
vaguely aware at that time). Rather, as 
indicated, debates focused on procedu­
ral versus substantive theory. To those 
who were brought up in the tradition 
of survey research, procedural theory 
was threatening, especially since its 
protagonists laid claim to the core of 
the planning curriculum. There was 
concern that this would be to the 
detriment of substantive theory and 
research. Often, this concern was 
couched in terms of theories about the 
object of planning being equally im­
portant as theories about the planning 
process.
In this atmosphere, I recast procedural
theory in the form of my present 
decision-centred view of planning. 
(Faludi 1982, 1986, 1987) I built on 
the “I.O.R.-School” which I had 
invoked in interpreting the findings of 
the Leiden-Oxford research. This 
school is best known for its “strategic 
choice approach”, and by that time I 
was also engaged in research relating 
to the application of this approach in 
the Dutch context (Faludi and Mastop
1982).
The intention behind advancing a 
decision-centred view was to clarify 
the issues in the proceduralist versus 
substantivist debate. By that time, 
there were already two sides to this 
debate. One related to a misconception 
about the intention behind procedural 
planning theory, as if the emphasis on 
procedures meant lack of appreciation 
for substantive knowledge. The other 
related to the Marxist-inspired chal­
lenge to planning theory.
I was trying to overcome the miscon­
ception as regards the role of substan­
tive knowledge by formulating what I 
was really against. Now, this was of 
course not the formulation of substan­
tive knowledge about the object of 
planning. Rather, it was against the 
misconceived idea, implied in 
“survey-before-plan”, that doing re­
search was all that there was to plan­
ning. Classic planning thought has 
always suffered from the positivistic 
idea that action springs directly from 
thorough research. The corollary is 
that policy should be left to experts. 
After all, they are the ones who know 
best.
I dubbed this the “object-centred” 
view of planning and characterized it 
as technocratic. It was a deliberate 
challenge to “substantivists” to spell 
out the nature of their claims about 
theories of the object of planning as 
forming the basis for.planning.
A third view which I formulated in 
response tq Marxist challenges I called 
the “control-centred” view. This was 
based on the conviction that Marxist 
debates were mainly about control, or 
rather the lack thereof, in planning. 
Thus, many of the studies concerned 
sought to demonstrate that planning 
was an epiphenomenon and that - 
irrespective of whether they were 
aware of it or not - planners were
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following the logic of capitalist accu­
mulation. The implication was that 
planning in any real sense of the word 
would have to wait until after the 
revolution, and that until then debunk­
ing of existing planning was the only 
worthwhile task for researchers.
The modest intention has not been to 
do justice to the Marxist-inspired 
literature as such, but to reconstruct 
fundamental views or, as I started 
calling them, paradigms of planning 
from it. I concluded that the albeit 
implicit assumptions about planning 
held by the authors concerned came 
down to the equation of planning with 
control over the means of production, 
hence “control-centred paradigm”. 
This paradigm focuses attention, not 
so much on planning as such, but on 
its preconditions in terms of the exer­
cise of power.
The decision-centred view is different 
in that it assumes there to be a suffi­
cient level of intervention in the envi­
ronment to warrant thought being 
given to how proposals for action are 
being formulated. According to the 
decision-centred view, planning then 
stands for rendering decisions mean­
ingful by analyzing them in their 
wider context of choice. In the past 
pride of place has gone to plans, and 
practical decisions have been expected 
to follow. The decision-centred view 
puts the onus on planners to make 
plans relevant to ongoing decision­
making. It will be evident why, after 
the Leiden-Oxford study, this appealed 
to me. It follows that plan-making 
must take ongoing decisions as its 
point of departure.
A focus on implementation was of 
course not new. However, in the past, 
the problem had been defined from the 
point of view of planners as that of 
overcoming obstacles in the way of 
rendering beautiful ideas enshrined in 
plans operational. Now, the issue was 
defined in a radically different way. 
Since operational decision-making was 
central, the role of plans was that of 
helping the decision makers.
This has implications for plan-evalua- 
tion. Departures do not necessarily 
indicate failure. That would only be 
the case if we thought that plans em­
bodied superior wisdom, so that the 
need for their implementation was a
forgone, conclusion. If, as the Leiden- 
Oxford research teaches us, this is not 
the case, if, in other words, we take 
seriously the contention that plans 
should be aids to decision makers 
rather than straitjackets, then all that 
needs to be insisted upon is that each 
decision must be well-considered, and 
that plans should help with doing 
precisely that: considering all the 
ramifications of decisions. Such issues 
have been thoroughly explored, lead­
ing to a distinct Dutch line of evalua­
tion research concerned with the 
performance of plans in assisting with 
day-by-day decision-making (Faludi 
1989, Alexander & Faludi 1989, 
Faludi & Korthals Altes 1994).
I was content with the three paradigms 
as a framework for organizing plan­
ning thought and started to further 
explore the decision-centred view of 
planning as the heir apparent to proce­
dural planning theory. A whole series 
of studies of Dutch planning since has 
been based on this view, and in the 
meantime important additions and 
modifications have occurred. At the 
same time, I had to contend with the 
fact that, with many others, the key 
authors belonging to the I.O.R.-school 
from which I had drawn inspiration 
were weary of rationality, a concept 
central to my “Planning Theory”. I 
started exploring the notion of ration­
ality as a decision rule in planning, 
analogous to Popper’s rules for ac­
cepting or rejecting scientific hypo­
theses. The analogy runs like this: 
each decision of a public authority 
must be well-considered. To this 
extent, the decision-centred view 
shares in the spirit of science. After 
all, the methodology of science evolv­
es around well-considered statements 
about reality. Like in scientific meth­
odology, the search is for a demarca­
tion criterion and a rule for when a 
decision may be considered justified. 
In “Critical Rationalism and Planning 
Methodology” (Faludi 1986) I submit 
that rationality is precisely this: a rule 
for identifying whether or not deci­
sions may be deemed to be well-con­
sidered.
A comprehensive statement of the 
decision-centred view in Dutch is by 
Mastop19. Defenders of substantive 
planning theory at Nijmegen Univer­
sity responded with an “action-orien- 
ted approach”. This approach is not,
however, the same as the “object- 
centred view of planning”. It does not 
cling to the positivism of classic plan­
ning thought saying that planning 
requires nothing but the thorough 
study of its object of concern, after 
which action, design, or policy, 
springs from the minds of planners 
ready-made.
In describing the action-oriented ap­
proach, we follow Needham (1988) in 
the same paper in which he Anglicizes 
“planologie”. Like the decision-cen­
tred view, this approach does not start 
with the making of plans, and this is 
another common denominator. How­
ever, unlike the decision-centred view, 
the action-oriented approach does not 
focus on the operational decisions of 
the planning subject either. Rather, its 
starting point is the bringing about of 
change, primarily via the spatial ac­
tions of others, hence “action-ori­
ented” approach.
The Nijmegen School has spawned 
three books20. The confrontation, such 
as it was, with the decision-centred 
view, more particularly with Mastop, 
took place in 198S21. It has laid the 
foundations for the now prevailing 
consensus22. Both approaches focus on 
social interaction around public deci­
sions and action concerning the envi­
ronment that follows. Both appreciate 
that the addressees of the planners’ 
messages interpret them in the light of 
their own situations as they perceive 
them. Lastly, both understand that, as 
human actors, these addressees are in 
principle free (albeit perhaps to their 
peril) to negate, subvert, and/or con­
travene plans. This not only forms the 
common basis, it also provides an 
entry point for grounding planning 
thought in contemporary social-science 
thinking.
The same proceduralist versus substan- 
tivist debate has prodded me to specify 
also how, from a decision-centred 
view, we might conceptualize the 
object of planning. I concluded’that 
the object of this type of planning are 
land decision units, or parcels of land. 
More specifically, this object is the set 
of conceivable measures taken with 
respect to the land decision units 
within the jurisdiction of a planning 
authority. In the first instance, we are 
talking about the measures of public 
authorities, but in the second instance
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of course also about the measures of 
private actors in their various capaci­
ties relating to land and resources 
(Faludi 1985, 1987). Such measures 
are in need of coordination, and this is 
the ultimate aim of planning.
This accords well with the consensus 
between protagonists of the decision- 
centred view and the action-oriented 
approach. What this means is that, 
lamentations about the state of the 
discipline in general and of planning 
theory in particular notwithstanding, a 
discipline is within grasp, and we in 
the Netherlands have made progress in 
formulating it. It partakes in the fam­
ily of policy sciences and as such it 
relates to action, more specifically 
action in what Friedmann (1987) 
describes as the public domain, with 
all the implications which flow from 
this. At the same time, planology is 
firmly rooted in an understanding of 
its object, and of the essential features 
of the types of action that flow from 
it, including appropriate types of 
planning.
Third Encounter: Planning Doctrine
From the beginning of my stay in the 
Netherlands, my ambition has been to 
engage in research, not only on local, 
but also and in particular of strategic 
planning. This was based on my 
perception that strategic planning, and 
more specifically national planning in 
the Netherlands has something unique 
to offer.
Initially, the Leiden-Oxford Study 
absorbed most of my energy, and 
attention to national planning was 
limited to student projects, first at 
Delft University of Technology23 and 
later at the University of Amsterdam. 
Thanks to De Ruijter, who had joined 
me at the University of Amsterdam24, 
the concern broadened to include the 
history of the Dutch planning profes­
sion. Joined in my explorations by 
Van der Valk, I have concerned 
myself with this field ever since. 
However, it was only in 1983 that I 
embarked on the first research on 
strategic planning of my own. This 
concerned an evaluation of the Urban­
ization Report, being part two of the 
Third National Physical Planning 
Report, published in 1976 and offi­
cially adopted as a so-called Key
Planning Decision in 1978. The 
Urbanization Report presented a 
growth-management package by arti­
culating an image of a desirable fu­
ture, together with a way of reaching 
it. At that time, planners (in particular 
of an urban design-bent) argued that 
plans should do precisely this: package 
attractive images, thereby ensuring 
plan implementation. This I found had 
been more or less what the Urbaniza­
tion Report had done. The report was 
one in a chain of documents. Between 
them, they had generated a definite 
view of what the country should look 
like. Decision makers were imbued 
with this view, and they acted accord­
ingly. That which provides such self- 
evident guidance is now being de­
scribed by us as “planning doctrine.”
This has set me on a course of sys­
tematically studying Dutch strategic 
planning throughout this century. Such 
research would have been impossible 
without a fairly substantial investment 
in the Netherlands in the education of 
Ph. D-candidates. Most academic 
research is now done by such candi­
dates employed for a period of four 
years. Their supervisors are required 
to develop programmes of research in 
which to accommodate them. This has 
given an impetus for the cumulation of 
insights. The professionalization of 
planning in relation to planning doc­
trine and to the discipline of planology 
has been the theme which we pursued. 
The studies have culminated in an 
overall evaluation of the Dutch plan­
ning system, including the philoso­
phies behind it, the view of plans and 
of planning on which it is based, and 
the performance of plans (Faludi & 
Van der Valk 1994).
One of the first studies in this series 
concerned late-nineteenth century 
planning in Amsterdam25. It is the 
study which has resulted in the identi­
fication of the technocratic and the 
sociocratic views of planning dis­
cussed above. The author, Van der 
Valk, did not limit himself to studying 
the various plans and how they were 
invoked in day-by-day decision­
making. Rather, he analyzed the sub­
stantive and procedural ideas held by 
professionals. These ideas form the 
mainspring of professional strategies. 
The study introduced the notion “sys­
tematic town expansion” to refer to 
the complex of such ideas. Systematic
town extension encapsulates expert 
thinking about planning. It signifies 
intent to do away with chaotic nine­
teenth-century development. Syste­
matic town expansion relates to the 
shape of development as well as to the 
manner in which order should be 
achieved. The quest for systematic 
town expansion was the driving force 
behind planning strategies and action. 
As such it makes us understand the 
development of planning.
Another study, by De Ruijter, con­
cerned with the setting up of the 
Netherlands Institute of Housing and 
Planning introduced the concept of a 
programme “for housing and plan­
ning”26. “Programme” stood for that 
which bound the coalition forming the 
Netherlands Institute for Housing and 
Planning together. The study was the 
first but not the only one to take its 
cues from the history and philosophy 
of science, especially Kuhn and Laka­
tos.
For instance, Zonneveld, in a study of 
planning concepts invoked since the 
twenties27, traced patterns in their 
formation, Zonneveld identified a 
“hard core” and “positive heuristics”, 
together with “explosive issues”, 
analogous to Kuhn’s “anomalies”. 
They cause fundamental change in the 
dominant “conceptual complex”, a 
notion comparable to that of a para­
digm.
All this relates to a theme in current 
discussions about policy-making, 
which is the importance of overall 
frames in consensus-building. The 
formulation of such frames is a key to 
political effectiveness. Hajer (1989, 
see also Hajer, 1994) picks up this 
theme, introducing the notion of hege­
monic project. A hegemonic project 
consists of a discourse, a system of 
positions and practices and strategic 
action. A discourse serves a specific 
cause, is related to a specific alliance 
and forms the basis for strategy. The 
struggle between discourses is the 
fight between groups “... to get their 
interpretation of the state of affairs 
dominant. It cannot be discussed 
usefully in terms only of discourse: it 
is basically a struggle for hegemony 
which involves more than ideology 
alone. It concerns the fight against a 
dominant hegemonic project, the 
emergence and formation of altema-
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tive projects and the transformation of 
existing alliances to keep in power” 
(Hajer 1989:41).
My own term for what Hajer calls a 
hegemonic project is planning doc­
trine. Planning doctrine delineates an 
arena for discussion and action. Here­
in lies its importance. By performing 
its framing role, doctrine enables 
“normal” planning. “Normal” plan­
ning involves primarily professional, 
administrative, and bureaucratic ac­
tors. Within the context of agreed- 
upon values and a generally imaged 
principle of spatial organization, 
professional-bureaucratic debate and 
political discourse can produce a 
succession of planning concepts to 
respond to changing situations. A 
benefit of having a doctrine is there­
fore to reduce the burden of plan- 
making. Planning becomes cumulative 
and progressive. This may account for 
the effectiveness of Dutch planning.
Now, planning doctrines (such as the 
Dutch) that have lasted and which 
have been successful have at times 
displayed significant changes. At the 
same time we are saying that these are 
the same doctrines throughout. How 
do we account for this? Alexander and 
Faludi (1990) invoke the analogy 
between doctrines and paradigms. 
Lakatos (1974) makes a distinction for 
paradigms (which he calls: “scientific 
research programmes”) between nega­
tive and positive heuristics. By a 
negative heuristic, the “hard core” of 
a research programme cannot change. 
The positive heuristic encourages 
development of a “protective belt” of 
theories, models and observations 
elaborating the core; these may 
change.
In planning doctrine, the same distinc­
tion can be made. Various concepts 
may be replaced throughout the life­
span of the doctrine. Thus, in.the 
Netherlands the emphasis in strategic 
planning has gone from concentric 
development around towns and cities 
to a policy of controlled dispersal and 
back to wliat is called the “compact- 
city” policy, all within one and the 
same doctrine evolving around Rand- 
stad and Green Heart. However, the 
doctrine itself, with its mobilizing 
metaphor as its hard core, is replaced 
in a different kind of discourse, one 
even more political and value-oriented.
Thus, if ever the Green Heart was 
abandoned, the reasoning goes that 
this would amount to a doctrinal revo­
lution, analogous to a scientific 
revolution, and the dissolution of the 
planning community arraying itself 
around the original doctrine.
The notion of a planning community 
has a bearing also on considerations of 
how planning relates to wider con­
cerns so that it can generate societal 
consensus. It would be preposterous to 
assume that the planning community, 
through the medium of a well-consid­
ered doctrine, could generate consen­
sus where it does not exist. That being 
said, it is possible to argue that Dutch 
planning doctrine has played a part in 
specifying pre-existing societal consen­
sus in the Netherlands by outlining an 
attractive manner of conceptualizing 
the shape of the country, and by fra­
ming Dutch policies accordingly.
The ultimate challenge is, of course, 
to turn the new understanding of how 
doctrines are being shaped, and how 
they in turn shape action, to good use. 
Are there such things as discourses on 
doctrines? The notion of Rein and 
Schon (1986) of “frame-reflective 
discourse” suggests that there are. Can 
we reasonably expect, as experts, to 
shed light on intensely political matters 
as the choice of doctrine? Or are, as 
Kuhn would no doubt argue, doctrines 
incommensurable, and thus beyond 
expert judgment? To put it another 
way: what is the developmental pat­
tern of doctrine? Are periods of “nor­
mal” planning, as Alexander and 
Faludi (1990) have put it in analogy to 
Kuhn’s normal science inevitably 
followed by doctrinal revolutions? 
Certainly in the Netherlands with its 
well-developed doctrine this is an 
urgent question. A study, to be com­
pleted in 199528, focuses on the dy­
namics of doctrinal development, 
using the Dutch Fourth National 
Physical Report as a case study. (See 
also Korthals Altes 1992) It explores 
the implications of more recent litera­
ture, in particular Laudan (1984). This 
suggests a pattern of doctrinal devel­
opment which is more evolutionary 
than revolutionary. The study puts 
flesh to the bones of an idea which 
Alexander and Faludi have explored: 
that of an “open” doctrine. The anal­
ogy between planning and science 
continues to provide fodder for
thought.
The Lessons?
To reiterate, the Dutch context is such 
that no direct lessons can be drawn. 
However, there are three indirect 
lessons which I venture to draw, and 
they relate to each of the encounters 
above.
One is to be humble about planning, 
and even more about plans. Plans do 
not always embody superior wisdom. 
Having said that, let me hasten to add 
that plans add an essential element to 
decision-making which is an aware­
ness of some of the wider ramifica­
tions of action. However, this is all 
that there is to plans. Day-by-day 
decision-making remains supreme.
The second lesson is encouraging. It is 
that town and country planning, urban 
and regional planning, physical plan­
ning, environmental planning, or 
whatever you would like to call our 
field, does have the makings of a 
discipline. Far be it from me to advo­
cate that the world adopts the term 
planology to refer to it. With the 
exception of recent attempts in Italy to 
introduce the term29, nobody uses it. 
However, it might be usefiil to pay 
attention to the conceptualization of 
the field and the approaches taken by 
Dutch academics.
The third lesson is that, to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of plan­
ning, in other words, to fulfil the 
promise of planology, academic re­
searchers need to do what the Dutch 
committee has demanded when defin­
ing planology: reflect upon planning 
and implementation. This needs to be 
done in a historical perspective to 
understand how issues have been 
framed and how debates and ap­
proaches and concepts have come to 
be sustained over time and what a 
determined planning community can 
achieve. Such academic research does 
pay a dividend in heightened under­
standing. For instance, in the face of 
the facile demand for wholesale 
change, we are now recommending to 
Dutch strategic planners to stick to 
their guns. Without the sustained 
effort of documenting past planning 
efforts and their successes, we would 
not have dared suggesting that existing
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Of course, we would not dare doing 
so for any other context where we 
have not done this groundwork either.
The research necessary for arriving at 
a deep understanding of planning is 
inherently context-specific, and it 
needs to be done locally. Occasion­
ally, somebody coming from the 
outside, like I have been to the 
Netherlands more than twenty-one 
years ago, is permitted to join the 
frail, but then he or she needs to get 
totally immersed in the local context.
Encounters of the third kind are a 
condition, therefore, of reflecting 
upon, let alone pronouncing upon, 
planning in any particular context.
You cannot do with less.
NOTES
1 Paper for the conference “Planning and Planning Education at a Time of Change", 27-29 June, 1995, East London, Republic of South Africa. Unless 
otherwise indicated, translations from the Dutch originals are by the author. For the convenience of readers who have no command of Dutch, 
references to Dutch sources have been relegated to footnotes.
2 These'courses combine a B.A. degree with a diploma in town and country planning. In the Netherlands, however, there are no diplomas as distinct 
from academic degrees, but the courses giving a planning degree are four years even so.
3 By that time I was unaware of Pressman and Wildawsky, 1973, whose work has spawned a whole implementation literature.
4 The project was financed by the then Centre for Environmental Studies in London.
5 The Delft team consisted of Steve Hamnett, now a professor at the University of South Australia, who had joined me after receiving his graduate 
diploma from Oxford Polytechnic, a number of Dutch research assistants and myself. There was a team of four involved at the Oxford end.
6 The findings in both countries are well-documented in the volume published by the two teams jointly; see Thomas et al, 1983.
7 In albeit modified this art is still operative.
8 Van der Valk AJ (1989). Amsterdam in aanleg: Planvorming en dagelijks handelen 1850-1900 (Planologische Studies 8), Institute of Planning and 
Demography, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, p419.
9 Unfortunately, I had made his acquaintance only briefly before he passed away in 1974.
10 De Casseres J (1929) “Grondslagen der Planologie”, De Gids 93, 376-394.
11 Bakker Schut P and Bakker Schut F (1944) Planologie, van uitbreidingsplan over streekplan naar nationaal plan, Noorduijn, Gorinchem.
12 Sectie Planologie en Stedebouwkunde i.o. (1972) Advies inzake de taakverdeling bij het wetenschappelijk onderwijs in de planologie; translation B. 
Needham.
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Demography, University of Amsterdam, p69.
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16 Kreukels AMJ (1975) “Stuurmethoden in de planning: Een overzicht met bijzondere aandacht voor de netwerkplanning en tegen de achtergrond van 
procesplanning”, Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting 55, 276-286; Kreukels, AMJ (1980) Planning en planningsproces, Ph.D thesis, University of 
Utrecht, VUGA, The Hague.
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see also: Linden G and Ganzevles T (1993) “Terugblik op het onderzoek Stadsgewest Nijmegen”, in A Dekker, P Ekkers, T Ganzevles and N Muller 
(eds), Gerrit Wissink: Dertig jaar universitaire planoloog (Nijmeegse Planologische Cahiers No 43), Department of Planology, Catholic University of 
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18 Van der Cammen H (1979) De binnenkant van de planologie, Ph.D, University of Amsterdam, Coutinho, Muiderberg, pp 174-184.
19 Mastop JM (1987, first edition 1984) Besluitvorming, handelen en normeren, Planologische Studies No 7, Institute of Planning and Demography, 
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
20 Needham B and Wissink GA (eds) (1982) “Ruimtelijkeplanning en ruimtelijke ontwikkeling”, Van Gorcum, Assen; Muller N and Needham B (1989) 
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21 Wissink GA, Needham B and Mastop JM (eds) (1985) “Planningmethodologie”, SRPO Cahier No 7, NIROV, The Hague.
22 For references to the similarities between the two schools see: Needham B, Dekker A (1989) “De handelingsgerichte benadering van de ruimtelijke 
planning en ordening: een uiteenzetting”, in: N Muller and B Needham (eds), Ruimtelijke handelen: Meewerken aan de ruimtelijke ontwikkeling, 
Kerckebosch, Zeist, pp 1-12; Van Marwijk A (1990) “Doorwerken met de Vierde Nota: Een interpretatie van de praktijk aan de hand van Giddens”, 
Working Papers of the Institute of Planning and Demography No. 144, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
23 For the most important results see Faludi A, De Ruijter P (1978) Planning als besluitvorming, Samsom, Alphen aan den Rijn.
approaches should be maintained.
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24 Sadly, Peter de Ruijter has passed away in 1986.
25 Van der Valk AJ (1989) Amsterdam in aanleg: Ptanvorming en dagelijks handelen 1850-1900, Planologische Studies No 8, Institute of Planning and 
Demography, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
26 De Ruijter P (1989) Voor volkshuisvesting en stedebouw, uitgeverij Matrijs, Utrecht.
27 Zonneveld W (1991) Conceptvorming in de ruimtelijke ordering: Patronen en processen (Planologische Studies 9A) Institute of Planning and 
Demography, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
28 Korthals Altes WK (1995) De Nederlandse planningdoctrine in het fin de siecle: Ervaringen met voorbereiding en doorwerking van de Vierde nota 
over de ruimtelijke ordening (Extra), Van Gorcum, Assen.
29 See Archibugi F (1994) “Verso uno nuova disciplina della pianificazione”, in: F Archibugi, P Bisogno (eds) Per uno teoria della pianificazione, 
Prometheus, Nr 16/17 (special issue) pp 40-42.
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